The past week has produced two highs, and a deep low, for European democracy. The swearing-in of Donald Tusk as Polish premier after his electoral victory over the illiberal Law and Justice party was one high. Another was the EU’s agreement, fending off threats of a veto by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, to start membership talks with Ukraine. But, in a low point, Orbán still blocked a four-year, €50bn EU aid deal for Kyiv, jeopardising its ability to fund its war with Russia. To ensure cash flows to Ukraine in 2024, and that the EU can remain an effective geopolitical player, it must find ways to tackle its “Orbán problem”.
EU leaders should start by being clear that Orbán is motivated largely by money. He needs EU funds to keep flowing to Hungary, boosting its economy, to underpin his support. Billions of euros have been blocked since 2021 over rule of law concerns. Hungary’s premier was last week trying to use his posturing over Ukraine as leverage to unblock the frozen funds. He also knows eventual EU membership for Kyiv would shrink the funding pie for Hungary and other central European members.
Orbán has no desire to “leave the EU”, as he said in an interview. Instead, he wants to “take it over”, with like-minded allies. What was notable last week, however, was how far Hungary’s leader remains from that goal, especially after Poland’s change of direction, and despite advances by populist leaders and parties elsewhere. Indeed, on Ukraine he was entirely isolated. With 26 leaders against him, even Orbán seemed to feel too weak to wield his threatened double-veto, instead leaving the room while the rest voted to launch accession talks with Kyiv.
But Orbán demonstrated his capacity to be a “spoiler”. EU capitals should therefore double down on using the tools they have to curb misbehaviour by him, and others who might follow a similar path. Now that Budapest cannot rely on Warsaw shielding it, they should make clear that triggering Article 7, suspending Hungary’s EU voting rights, is again possible, even if some states are queasy about using this “nuclear option”.
Having worked hard to create a more usable mechanism allowing funds to be blocked if member states go into reverse on democracy and rule of law, EU leaders should not flinch from wielding it. Orbán has now shown how this can be twisted into leverage against the EU. Although €10bn of funds were released last week after Brussels said concerns had been met, there should be no “dirty” deals to unfreeze further blocked money to Hungary without good reason, even for the sake of Ukraine. Doing so would emasculate the EU’s most credible enforcement tool.
On financing Kyiv, the EU must find another route — via an intergovernmental agreement of 26 states. This is messier, but can keep money flowing for now. Similar workarounds might be possible on some other policies — though not on enlargement where, as Orbán noted, the requirement for unanimity at every step creates multiple future chances for Hungary to block Ukraine’s progress.
This latest episode has laid bare once again structural problems with EU decision-making that must be addressed now that further expansion to half a dozen or more new members is in prospect. More decisions need to be taken by qualified majority, and there needs to be greater scope for “coalitions of the willing” to press ahead with initiatives.
EU states are unlikely to relinquish the need for unanimity on taking in new members — though it might conceivably be limited to the start and end of the process. For now, EU leaders will have to use what means they can to coax and shame Orbán into not deploying his veto on Ukraine. For Europe’s wider stability, it is welcome that enlargement is back on the cards. But, as it grows, the EU cannot allow its functioning to be held hostage by a small minority.
